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Introduction  
With the “composite dialogue” between India and Pakistan most recently producing its own 
version of “cricket diplomacy” and a offer by Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf to discuss 
the re-drawing of Kashmir’s borders, India-Pakistan relations appear to be at a high-water mark. 
Three years after the two nations appeared set for their fourth war over Kashmir, the tension in 
South Asia has lifted. A change brought about by “a realization on both sides that war is not an 
option,” proclaimed Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar.[1] Yet, it is a naive to believe that 
a solution to the Kashmir dispute is imminent or that armed conflict is out of the question. In fact, 
it is more likely that Kashmir will avoid resolution for at least the next several years and that 
violence and obstinacy will continue to plague the region.  
Although a rapid resolution to the Kashmir dispute is unlikely, there is hope that an uneasy truce 
will remain in place. This is possible because of three conditions:  
1. One, Pakistan’s decision to side with the United States in its war against the Taliban and 
al Qaeda resurrected a U.S.-Pakistan partnership that deteriorated at the end of the Cold 
War. Historically, periods in which Pakistan and the United States cooperate correlate to 
periods which Pakistan has moderated its behavior in Kashmir.  
2. Two, India was able to effectively use the events of September 11, 2001 to its advantage 
and, citing the United States as an example, threatened Pakistan with war and backed it 
up with a major military mobilization if it did not halt cross border terrorism.  
3. Three, the current Pakistani leadership, led by President Pervez Musharraf, who remains 
the country’s top military official, understands the threat Islamic fundamentalists pose to 
the future of their nation and appears intent on reigning in this segment of their society. 
This was a process that President Mus harraf began prior to September 11, 2001 and was 
accelerated, broadened, and deepened in its aftermath.  
However, these conditions do not indicate that Pakistan is willing to compromise on Kashmir. It is 
not, at least not yet. The conditions listed above significantly impact Pakistan’s strategy—how it 
chooses to pursue its goals in Kashmir—but they have little impact on its policy, its actual 
objectives in Kashmir.  
Pakistan’s objectives in Kashmir are primarily driven by internal factors. These factors are: a 
weak national identity, feeble political institutions, an inability to establish sovereignty throughout 
its territory, and the development and fostering of a national psyche that believes it is under siege. 
From Pakistan’s inception its policy in Kashmir was driven by these factors—and they still exist 
today.  
Why Pakistan Can't Let Go 
The path to a resolution in Kashmir will be arduous and it is important that expectations be 
reconciled with what is possible in South Asia. Expectations must be managed because there is a 
difference between Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy. Pakistan’s 
Kashmir policy, its objective, has been relatively unchanged since 1947. Utilizing the language of 
self-determination, and supported by United Nations resolutions that called for Kashmir’s status to 
be determined in accordance with the will of the Kashmir people, Islamabad has sought the full 
accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.  
Although Musharraf has stated that he is willing to meet India “halfway” and put aside the U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions,[2] that should not be interpreted as tacit acceptance of the Line of 
Control (LoC) as the border. Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir has survived fifty years, two failed 
military operations, civilian and military governments, economic and military sanctions, and the 
threat of nuclear weapons. Even when the threat of war loomed in January 2002, President 
Pervez Musharraf repeated Pakistan’s unyielding position on Kashmir:  
Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. The entire world 
knows this. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. 
We will never budge an inch from our principle stand on Kashmir. The Kashmir problem needs to 
be resolved by dialogue and peaceful means in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri 
people and the United Nations resolutions. We have to find the solution to this dispute.[3]  
The psychological and political underpinnings that caused Pakistan to seek Kashmir’s accession 
at independence still exist. Ethnic cleavages continue to be a divisive issue, institutions remain 
weak, and the last fifty years have mostly reinforced Pakistan’s beliefs about India’s hegemonic 
intentions. The resilience of Pakistan’s policy demonstrates that changes in the external 
environment, even military defeat, did little to change this policy. Even though he acknowledges 
the need for flexibility, Musharraf continues to stress that “Kashmir and strategic assets are our 
national interests and we will not give them up... There is no sell-out, I have said a hundred times, 
I am not a man to sell out.”[4]  
This policy has its origins in the two-nation theory that Muhammad Ali Jinnah utilized to convince 
the British that a separate nation for the Muslims of South Asia was necessary in order to protect 
them from Hindu domination and to ensure peace. Jinnah’s insistence on two nations, one Hindu 
and one Muslim, was driven by the belief that Muslims would be politically, economically, and 
socially dominated by Hindus in a single state.[5] The outbreak of communal violence between 
Hindus and Muslims during the struggle for independence reinforced Jinnah’s claims. Once he 
had won the battle for two separate states, Jinnah and his Hindu rivals, Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Mohandas Gandhi, began to jockey for territory. Pakistan’s leaders believed that Kashmir’s 
territorial contiguity with Pakistan, the pre-existing economic and political ties with Pakistan, and 
its Muslim majority made its accession to Pakistan a near certainty.  
When this did not happen, Pakistan’s leaders interpreted Kashmir’s accession to India as 
evidence of an insidious Indian scheme to weaken and eventually eliminate Pakistan. In a 
statement to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in January 1948, Pakistan charged, 
“That India has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme and has, since June 1947, 
been making persistent attempts to undo it.”[6] India’s use of its military to quash independence 
bids by the princely states of Hyderabad and Junagadh reinforced Pakistani trepidation. From the 
Pakistani perspective, India’s actions in Kashmir were seen as the most threatening to the 
survivability of Pakistan and the most poignant evidence of the Hindu desire to dominate South 
Asia and contributed to the development of a national psyche that believes that is under siege 
and views compromise on Kashmir as the first step toward elimination.  
Whether the threat was real or imagined, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has become highly politicized 
and inflexible because of Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s national identity and the 
widespread support the struggle received from the major domestic actors.[7] Pakistani leaders of 
all shades pandered to a public stung by the tragedy of partition and emphasized Kashmir in 
Pakistan’s struggle against the Hindu behemoth. Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, 
expressed this sentiment that Kashmir was part of the larger struggle of Muslims on the 
subcontinent against Hindu aggression in a speech in November 1947: “Our heart goes out to 
them—our brethren in this mortal struggle, for the choice before them now is freedom or death. If 
the plans of their enemies succeed they will be exterminated, as Muslims in various other parts of 
India have been exterminated.”[8]  
The belief that India’s strategy in Kashmir was intended to erode Pakistan’s independence 
provided the ideological and emotional underpinnings of Pakistan’s position, but it was Pakistan’s 
internal political circumstances that fostered the nation’s obsession with Kashmir.  
First among these internal circumstances driving Pakistan’s policy was the crisis of identity that 
Pakistan suffered from the moment of independence.[9] Ayub Khan explained the problem 
succinctly, when he remarked that prior to 1947 “none of us was in fact a Pakistani.”[10] This 
problem was two-fold. First, the most obvious source of national solidarity, Islam, was problematic 
because of the secular character of Pakistan’s new leadership. Second, although most of the 
Pakistani population was Muslim, the state of Pakistan was comprised of individuals that mostly 
identified themselves along on ethnic and tribal lines.  
Pakistan’s Islamic identity posed problems for the new nation because the secular leaning 
politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers that occupied the positions of power in the new state 
did not want to make Islam the sole basis of national identity. Trained and schooled in British 
secular ideals, they were leery of rallying around an idea that inherently put them at a political 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the Islamic religious authorities. Pakistan’s new secular leadership 
envisioned a secular, Islamic state and relying on appeals to Islam in order to forge a nation 
would have provided the traditional religious authorities a mechanism to assume political power.  
Even if the Pakistani leadership had opted to forge a nation based on religious solidarity, it would 
have been forced to do so in the face of the profound challenges presented by the ethnic and 
tribal loyalties that trumped all other forms of identification. Jinnah’s two-nation theory divided the 
subcontinent along religious lines, but Islam alone had not been a strong enough force for Jinnah 
to forge a sense of nationalism.[11] The Pashtun in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) are 
one example how ethnic divisions were a problem for the new state and how the struggle for 
Kashmir became an entangled with Pakistan’s internal crisis.  
When the prospect of independence arose, Gaffar Khan, the “Frontier Gandhi,” was remarkably 
successful in mobilizing a Pashtun nationalist movement that sought independence for the NWFP. 
In fact, had it not been for Jinnah’s ability to convince Mountbatten that he would be opening a 
Pandora’s box of ethnic fragmentation if he allowed independence, it is likely the NWFP and the 
adjacent tribal areas would have opted for independence.[12] When the vote was held to 
determine which nation the NWFP would join, Ghaffar Khan boycotted it, but the decision for the 
Pashtun Muslims who did vote was easy—99 percent voted to join Pakistan.[13] Despite the 
overwhelming vote in favor of accession to Pakistan, the central government in Karachi realized it 
had a problem. This problem, the inability to exert its authority throughout its territory, also 
contributed to Pakistan’s policy. The nascent government was in no position to directly challenge 
the relatively well-armed tribesmen, and the jihad in Kashmir served as a useful distraction from 
the idea of a Pashtunistan, the proposed homeland for Pakistan’s Pashtuns.[14]  
Figure 1: Pakistan’s Major Ethnic Groups[ 15] 
 
In addition to the Pashtuns, Pakistan consisted of four other major ethnic groups: Baloch, Punjabi, 
Sindhi, and Mohajir. The Mohajirs, Muslims that fled from areas of South Asia that had become 
part of India, possessed a disproportionate amount of political power because of the positions 
they held in the Muslim League, which had essentially morphed into the Pakistan government. 
Sensitive to their status as minorities and transplants, many Mohajirs were the most ardent 
advocates of the two-nation theory and were especially sensitive to India’s attempt to annex 
Kashmir. Surrounded by Pashtuns and Punjabis, ethnic groups that had reputations as fierce 
warriors, the Mohajirs reluctance to appear weak also contributed to their refusal to concede on 
the highly charged issue of Kashmir.  
With both ethnic and religious definitions of nationality problematic, Pakistani leaders attempted 
to rally the new nation against the threat of the imposing Hindu neighbor as a way to forge a 
sense of unity. The consequence of the focus on India was the “India syndrome,” defined by Jean 
Luc-Racine, as “a feeling of insecurity [that] has been nurtured constantly since 1947... its 
successive leaders have not been able to free the national mind from its Indian obsession—rather, 
they used it deliberately for their own purposes.”[16] Therefore, the decision to fight for Kashmir 
not only had ideology to support it, but it also had the political objectives, primarily that the 
struggle for Kashmir served to strengthen the tenuous national bonds of the new nation-state.  
In conjunction with these nationalist goals, the struggle between embryonic institutions further 
contributed to Pakistan’s uncompromising position on Kashmir. When Jinnah died shortly after 
partition, Pakistan’s prospects for a strong, secular, civilian government suffered a major blow 
and power rapidly devolved to the institutions that had been previously established by the 
British—the military and the bureaucracy. Prior to 1956, political power rested mostly in the hands 
of the Governor-General. The prime minister and his cabinet possessed very little power. In fact, 
they served at the behest of the governor-general. This early institutional imbalance had several 
political consequences with regards to Pakistan’s strategy toward Kashmir.  
First, in order to compensate for their lack of real power, politicians attempted to build a political 
base by pandering to the public’s emotions. In August of 1953, at a large demonstration in 
Karachi protesting the Indian government’s removal and arrest of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, 
the Pakistani Prime Minister told the crowd that his government would not rest “until they have 
secured for the people of Kashmir their inalienable right to determine their future by free exercise 
of their vote.”[17] Three days later at an Independence Day celebration he declared: “We are 
bound to the people of Kashmir by ties of religion, culture, tradition, economy and geography. It is 
but natural that we should feel the deepest sympathy for them in their hour of trial.”[18]  
Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity, Pakistan’s internal 
divisions and weaknesses, and the imbalance in institutional strength led Pakistan to see Kashmir 
in uncompromising terms. In Pakistan’s case the dispute had dual purposes. On the one hand, 
Kashmir was an ideological struggle against India and its ambitions. On the other, the dispute 
served to unite an otherwise fractured polity. Since it had both ideological and nationalist 
implications, neither of which is easily compromised, Pakistan’s policy toward Kashmir became 
rigid and unyielding.  
Fifty years of hostile relations with India have reinforced Pakistan’s Kashmir policy because it has 
confirmed Pakistan’s notion that India’s occupation of Kashmir was intended to simultaneously 
demonstrate that Pakistan was politically unnecessary and physically weaken it. Kashmir became 
sacrosanct in Pakistani politics and it is politically untenable to “lose” Kashmir. Over time, the cost 
of surrender in Kashmir has risen. Too much Pakistani blood has been spilled over Kashmir for 
any government to survive a capitulation on Kashmir. In addition to years of confidence building 
with India, altering Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir will require major domestic changes. Therefore, 
the United States should, at least in the short-term, focus on encouraging Pakistan toward a 
strategy that does not provoke an Indian retaliation that could spiral toward nuclear war.  
The Evolution of Pakistan’s Strategy  
In contrast to Pakistan’s policy, its strategy has responded to external stimuli. Pakistan has used 
diplomacy, war, and proxy war to pursue its claim to Kashmir. Each strategy was the product of 
both internal and external constraints or opportunities and was selected because it was 
considered to be the most effective way to pursue Pakistan’s objectives. By analyzing Pakistan’s 
decision to launch a military assault in 1965 after fourteen years of diplomacy and the initiation of 
a proxy war in the early 1990s three conclusions become evident. First, changes in Pakistan’s 
domestic power structure have an important impact on Pakistan’s strategy because they can 
either reduce or increase the strategies available to the policymakers. Second, Pakistan’s 
assessment of what the external environment necessitates or allows has been crucial to the type 
of strategy Pakistan utilizes. Third, the United States-Pakistan relationship has had an important 
influence on Islamabad’s strategy decisions.  
Despite its stated inflexible policy, Pakistan used diplomatic instruments to pressure India to yield 
on Kashmir during the 1950s and early 1960s. This strategy did not shift when India forsook the 
option of a plebiscite in Kashmir, the pillar of Pakistan’s legal position. This alteration only came 
after Pakistan assessed that it had rectified the post-partition military imbalance vis-à-vis India 
and the United States-Pakistan relationship suffered a major decline. When the United States 
warmed up to India during the early 1960s and then initiated an economic and military aid 
program to India after its war with China in 1962, Pakistan concluded that time was not on its side 
and that its window for obtaining a satisfactory solution to Kashmir was closing. A brief uprising, 
which began after a hair believed to have belonged to the Prophet Muhammad went missing, 
provided Pakistan’s leaders with reason to believe Kashmiris were ripe for revolt. However, it was 
nearly two years later, in August 1965, after United States-Pakistan relations had gone from 
strained during the Kennedy Administration to poor with the Johnson Administration, that 
Pakistan launched a military assault into Kashmir. It was an effort to accomplish militarily what 
their diplomatic strategy had failed to do.  
Six years later, the East Pakistan rebellion and India’s intervention divided Pakistan in half and 
resulted in the independent state of Bangladesh. The event directly challenged Pakistan’s claim 
that all Muslims of South Asia should belong to one state. Although the tenure of Prime Minister 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is often seen as a period of relative stability in Kashmir, Bhutto’s decision to 
launch Pakistan’s nuclear development program and his rhetorical campaign to maintain 
Kashmir’s disputed status reveal that he conceded nothing to India. In fact, Bhutto’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons began the process of moving Pakistan’s strategy toward asymmetric options 
because conventional military options were no longer considered feasible. Additionally, Bhutto’s 
mishandling of the political situation in Pakistan increased the role Islamist forces in Pakistani 
society. After his rigging of the elections in 1977, the chaos that engulfed the nation provided the 
impetus for General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq to reassert military control in Pakistan.  
Zia, a devote Muslim, recognized the popular support that the Islamist parties possessed and, 
rather than suppress them, chose to co-opt the Islamists into his government. The nature of the 
Afghan war institutionalized the bonds between the military, the Islamist parties, and their 
associated mujahedin fighting in Afghanistan. Notably, as during the 1970s, Kashmir was 
relatively calm during most of the 1980s and there was little mention of cross-border terrorism by 
the Indian leadership. In 1989, however, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the following 
year the United States abandoned its relationship with Pakistan. Also, in 1989 an indigenous 
Kashmiri uprising provided an opportunity for Pakistan to reverse the Indian attempts to degrade 
Kashmir’s status as disputed territory. Devoid of a relationship with the United States and with 
weak political leadership, diverting the attention of the highly energized, extremely violent 
segment of Pakistani society returning from Afghanistan and refocusing the political economy that 
had developed to fight the Soviets was a highly attractive option. Thus, Pakistan shifted from a 
strategy of negotiations to a proxy war strategy.  
Pakistan’s strategy to bleed India continued through the 1990s under both Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif, a Punjabi with a close relationship with the Islamist parties, and Benazir Bhutto, the 
daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was educated in the West and espoused secular, progressive 
principles similar to her father. Through most of the 1990s, it appeared that Pakistan was getting 
the results it sought from its strategy in Kashmir. India was unable to pacify the region, and 
therefore it remained an issue on the international agenda (although relatively low on that list). 
Additionally, Indian soldiers were dying and Pakistani soldiers were not. By 1999, however, the 
insurgency began to wane and the Pakistani-supported mujahedin had managed to alienate the 
Kashmiri people. With the threat of nuclear war looming over South Asia after India and Pakistan 
tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, Pakistan believed that it could make a limited incursion 
across the LoC and India’s ability to retaliate would be constrained because of international 
concern over the possibility of nuclear war. Instead, the Clinton administration viewed Pakistan’s 
provocation as a threat to the entire world and Nawaz Sharif was offered only limited political 
cover and no option but to order the withdrawal of Pakistan’s forces.  
The Kargil operation was not irrational or the product of an over zealous rogue agency. In fact, 
the operation can be seen as an extension of Pakistan’s proxy war strategy. Since the insurgency 
had lost momentum and in light of its numerous benefits, Pakistan sought a way to re-energize 
it.[19] At the same time, the results of the Kargil operation “probably caused the Pakistani 
leadership to conclude that Kargil-like operations are not legitimate in the current international 
environment.”[20] The reasons for this are two-fold. First, Pakistan’s leaders understand that 
international, and particularly U.S., condemnation will entail severe economic and political 
consequences.[21] Second, India’s willingness to escalate the conflict, especially the extensive 
use of air power, demonstrated that nuclear weapons were not necessarily the firewall against a 
wider war that Pakistani decision-makers had anticipated.[22] 
Beyond Proxy War—First Steps Toward Resolution 
The manner in which Kashmir’s accession was obtained, the belief that India’s control over 
Kashmir was intended to weaken Pakistan so that it could not survive, and India’s invasion of 
East Pakistan have all reinforced Pakistan’s mistrust of India. If those are the underlying reasons 
for Pakistan’s policy, then changing it will require, at a minimum, a change in Pakistani beliefs 
about India and a change in Pakistanis understanding of what Kashmir means to their nation. 
These are changes that will require years, and if Pakistan continues to support a proxy war they 
are changes that will not come. Therefore, the first task should be to focus on ending the proxy 
war.  
President Musharraf indicated in his first major address to the nation after assuming power in 
October 1999 that he saw the rise of militant Islam as a threat to Pakistan. He stated, “Islam 
teaches tolerance, not hatred, universal brotherhood and not enmity, peace not violence, 
progress not bigotry.” He also urged the ulema “to curb elements which are exploiting religion for 
vested interests and bringing bad name to our faith.”[ 23] When he pitched his plan to rehabilitate 
Pakistan’s reputation and economy by eliminating militancy and violence to an annual conference 
of Pakistan’s top clerics in June 2001, he informed them that the world “looks upon us as 
terrorists.” He explained, “We have been killing each other, and now we want to spread violence 
and terror abroad. Naturally, the world regards us as terrorists.”[24] In August that year, the 
Pakistani government made its first strike against militant Islamist organizations when it banned 
the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad. The events of September 11, 2001 appear to 
have accelerated Musharraf’s plan to rein in the Islamist organizations, however, until that point 
there was no discussion of changing strategies in Kashmir. India’s bid to utilize the atmosphere 
created by the U.S. war on terror forced Pakistan to re-assess the costs and benefits of 
maintaining its proxy war strategy.  
Prior to the crisis in January 2002, Pakistan realized the rising violence, weapons smuggling, and 
growing militancy posed a threat to the nation. Sartaj Aziz, a former Pakistani foreign and finance 
minister, observed, “For every ten [militants] who are trained here to fight in Kashmir, one goes 
and the rest stay in Pakistan to cause trouble.”[25] But the assault on India’s Parliament 
demonstrated that unpredictable militant proxies presented a greater risk to Pakistan beyond the 
danger of fomenting internal instability. The proxy war strategy was useful because it was a 
weapon that Pakistan believed it controlled. The Taliban’s obstinacy in the face of U.S. demands 
and the series of militant attacks against India indicated that any Pakistani notion of control was 
illusory. In late 2001, Retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Talat Masood acknowledged that 
Pakistan was going to have to make adjustments in its Kashmir strategy: “Thanks to the U.S. 
antiterrorism campaign, the mujahedin fighting in Kashmir will have to be reined in. The state has 
to have a monopoly of armed force. Above all, our possession of nuclear weapons makes this 
essential, because there is internal instability here, there will be attempts at intense international 
scrutiny of us.”[26]  
Musharraf’s decision to rein in the proxy war won him the enmity of the militants and their 
supporters. Retired Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, the former head of ISI, criticized Musharraf for 
“only echoing India’s position” by calling those who attacked India’s Parliament terrorists during 
his 12 January 2002 speech.[27] Since the speech, rumors have swirled about Musharraf’s ability 
to withstand the militant backlash. However, he has endured the criticism of the Islamist 
organizations as well as two failed assassination attempts in December 2003. Moreover, despite 
speculation, there has been no evidence that the military brass is opposed to the shift and is 
plotting a coup to unseat Musharraf.  
Throughout his tenure, Musharraf’s administration has continued to focus on the rehabilitation of 
Pakistan’s reputation, its economy, and its relationship with the United States. His score on the 
economy has been positive and his decision to abandon the Taliban in the face of U.S. pressure 
restored Pakistan’s status as a U.S. ally. It has been more difficult for Musharraf to restore 
Pakistan’s international reputation because of the proxy war in Kashmir and the revelations by 
Abdul Qadeer Khan that he was surreptitiously selling nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, 
and Libya. However, despite knowing that cracking down on Khan, a national hero in Pakistan, 
would bring public anger, Musharraf decided it was necessary to assuage U.S. and international 
concerns. It appears that Musharraf is convinced that the costs of maintaining a proxy war in 
Kashmir now outweigh its benefits. The United States has a crucial part in ensuring that Pakistan 
remains committed to that assessment.  
Pakistan’s leaders recognize that their current favorable standing with the United States is largely 
due to the U.S. war on terror and Pakistan’s willingness to assist in that war. Prior United States-
Pakistan partnerships have been forged in response to common threats and when these threats 
receded, so did the usefulness of the relationship. This pattern has led to a perception on 
Pakistan’s part that the United States has been a fickle friend. It remains concerned over what the 
United States will do when bin Laden is caught and the war on terror’s urgency eases.[28] Will 
U.S. assistance last beyond the capture of Osama bin Laden? Will sanctions be renewed against 
Pakistan for its nuclear program?  
Although the United States can not force Pakistan to shift its policy on Kashmir, it should continue 
its effort to persuade Pakistan to shift away from proxy war. In order to do this, a two-pronged 
strategy is necessary. First, the United States should establish a partnership with Pakistan that is 
grounded in the understanding that Pakistan’s future is a national security interest of the United 
States. Pakistan’s economic, political, and institutional development is in the interest of the United 
States. The United States-Pakistan relationship must be rooted in this belief. Pakistan still values 
and seeks a strong relationship with the United States. The United States should use this 
influence and establish a commitment to Pakistan that goes “beyond bin Laden.”[29] The Bush 
administration is on the right track. Its agreement to provide a three billion dollar aid package over 
five years indicates a serious long-term U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s development. Second, the 
United States must press Pakistan to liberalize its economy and strengthen its political 
institutions.[30] In the long run, a one man solution is not sustainable and only a government with 
clear political legitimacy will be able to make any concessions on Kashmir.  
With a framework for a long-term United States-Pakistan commitment established, Pakistan must 
understand that with commitment comes responsibilities. Although the United States and 
Pakistan cooperated in a proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the use of militant proxies 
has had negative repercussions for both the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan must 
understand that its national interests are jeopardized as a result of this proxy war strategy and it 
must end. The United States should continue to quietly press Pakistan to maintain its crackdown 
on militants within its borders. Beyond the economic and societal costs of the strategy, the 
introduction of nuclear weapons has made the frequent crisis instigated by the insurgency 
extremely dangerous.  
Finally, India has a critical role in Pakistan’s continued shift away from proxy war. India should 
maintain its position that it will no longer tolerate a proxy war strategy, but it also should provide 
Pakistan with incentives to pursue a peaceful strategy. Its agreement to discuss all bilateral 
issues, including Kashmir, in the composite dialogue meetings is an important first step toward 
India’s acknowledgment that Kashmir is a political problem and that refusing to address the 
dispute with Pakistan over the last fifty years has failed to solve it. India’s willingness to discuss 
the issue and the initiation of a process that facilitates confidence-building should provide 
Pakistan’s leaders with the necessary political capital to maintain this shift away from proxy war 
and to continue the peace process.  
It appears that India and Pakistan agree that their approach to the issue must change, creating 
the necessary flexibility in their respective policies is likely to take years. Kashmir is a political 
question loaded with national identity and sovereignty implications for India and Pakistan that 
make it far more important and complicated than simply a territorial dispute. Reaching a solution 
that accounts for these complexities will require years of confidence building measures and 
internal political changes, but a solution will not be reached with the continuation of the proxy war. 
The United States should not attempt to mediate the dispute. However, it should continue to stay 
actively involved and stress the political, economic, and societal costs the Kashmir dispute has on 
both countries and help the leaders of India and Pakistan fend off demands from hard-liners in 
their countries that advocate a more violent strategy to settle the dispute.  
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